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Abstract
The devolution of user rights of wildlife in southern Africa has led to a
widespread land-use shift from livestock farming to game ranching. The eco-
nomic advantages of game ranching over livestock farming are significant, but
so too are the risks associated with breeding financially valuable game where
free-ranging wildlife pose a credible threat. Here, we assessed whether the con-
servation potential of game ranching, and a decentralized approach to conser-
vation more generally, may be undermined by an increase in human–wildlife
conflict. We demonstrate that game rancher tolerance towards free-ranging
wildlife has significantly decreased as the game ranching industry has evolved.
Our findings reveal a conflict of interest between wealth and wildlife conser-
vation resulting from local decision making in the absence of adequate cen-
tralized governance and evidence-based best practice. As a fundamental pil-
lar of devolution-based natural resource management, game ranching proves
an important mechanism for economic growth, albeit at a significant cost to
conservation.
Introduction
The governance of natural resources has historically
resided with the state (Child 2004). However, decen-
tralization of governance has produced a devolution-
ary shift in natural resource management over the past
four decades (Parker et al. 2015), particularly in devel-
oping countries (Ribot et al. 2006; Larson & Soto 2008).
This shift to local resource management is based on the
premise that local people are committed to sustainable re-
source use (Cousins et al. 2008). In southern Africa, poli-
cies that once established centralized control over wildlife
were replaced by legislative changes that bestowed cus-
todial rights of wildlife to individual property owners
(Bothma et al. 2009; Lindsey et al. 2009a). Following the
mantra “if it pays, it stays,” southern African govern-
ments sought to align environmental management objec-
tives with the socioeconomic needs of local people (Child
2004). This devolution-based legislation encouraged
innovation among the private and communal sectors
(Child 2012), resulting in a rapid and widespread land-
use shift in rangelands from livestock farming to game
ranching (Cloete et al. 2007; Lindsey et al. 2009b).
Game ranching in southern Africa is now synony-
mous with private- and community-based natural re-
source management (Bothma et al. 2009). Although
largely perceived to benefit environmental conservation
through the protection of habitat and biodiversity (Lind-
sey et al. 2009b), game ranching inherently increases
interactions—and potentially conflict—between valuable
game species and free-ranging wildlife (Lindsey et al.
2013). Many free-ranging large mammals across south-
ern Africa are ecologically vital as keystone species, and
act as biodiversity indicators (Dalerum et al. 2008), but
typically accrue little direct financial benefit to game
ranchers. In contrast, commercial game species repre-
sent important agricultural assets that represent substan-
tial financial resources (Van Der Merwe et al. 2004).
Conservation Letters, June 2016, 0(0), 1–11 Copyright and Photocopying: C© 2016 The Authors. Conservation Letters published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 1
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.
Conservation costs of game ranching R. T. Pitman et al.
Ranchers are therefore unlikely to tolerate (defined here
as the willingness to accept an event despite challenging
circumstances; adapted from Treves & Naughton-Treves
2005) free-ranging wildlife potentially threatening those
assets through depredation or infrastructure damage. De-
creased tolerance may be further intensified by economic
instability (Dickman 2010), particularly as agricultural
sectors can act as economic buffers during periods of fi-
nancial crises (Headey et al. 2010), which often result
in increased investment and financial reliance on agri-
cultural productivity (Allen & Giovannetti 2010; Headey
et al. 2010).
Limpopo Province, South Africa (ca. 125,977 km2;
hereafter “Limpopo,” Figure 1), has a largely impover-
ished human population, the highest density of game
ranches in South Africa (Carruthers 2008), and an abun-
dance of free-ranging wildlife. Game ranch establish-
ment peaked across South Africa, and particularly in
Limpopo (van der Waal & Dekker 2000), during the
early 1990s (Van Der Merwe et al. 2004), with expan-
sion subsequently reducing by the turn of the millen-
nium (van der Waal & Dekker 2000; Bothma & Sartorius
Von Bach 2010). Game ranching represents a core com-
ponent of the agricultural sector, and has recently shifted
from breeding large numbers of common game species
towards breeding fewer high-value species with increas-
ingly intensive management (Lindsey et al. 2009b) (Sup-
porting Information S1). This land-use shift may exacer-
bate levels of conflict by increasing the financial threat
posed by free-ranging wildlife and possibly result in in-
creased adoption of conflict mitigation measures, such as
problem animal control, or the use of heavily fortified
predator-proof fencing (Lindsey et al. 2013). Here, we as-
sess whether the conservation potential of game ranch-
ing, and a decentralized approach to conservation more
generally, may be undermined by an increase in human–
wildlife conflict in Limpopo from 2003 to 2012. We
explore the evolution of game ranching practices from
extensive to intensive, to better understand the concomi-
tant change in game rancher tolerance of free-ranging
wildlife, and integrate this mechanistic understanding
into the challenges facing conservation policy making
more generally.
We hypothesized that given the economic reliance
on agriculture during times of financial crises, invest-
ment within the agricultural sector (e.g., game ranching)
should have increased around the global economic cri-
sis of 2008, which severely impacted South Africa (Allen
& Giovannetti 2010). We expected that as game ranch-
ing profitability increases, tolerance towards free-ranging
wildlife that threaten game ranching assets should de-
crease. Finally, we predicted that decreased tolerance
should lead to increased problem animal control, and
increased predator-proof fencing, in an attempt to reduce
interactions between valuable game and free-ranging
wildlife that pose a significant threat.
Methodology
Measuring the scale and profitability of game
ranching
Limpopo’s annual game auction records, comprising
numbers of game sold, average price, and annual
turnover (i.e., annual sales volume) for each species,
were obtained from the Vleissentraal online database
(www.vleissentraal.co.za; accessed December 2013).
Livestock auction records of economically important
breeds (e.g., Bonsmara cattle Bos taurus, Merino and
Dorper sheep Ovis aries) were obtained from Farmer’s
Weekly archives (National Library of South Africa, Pre-
toria). Game were categorized into common breeds and
high-value breeds based on their maximum average
price (common game  ZAR 10,000; high-value game
> ZAR 10,000 per animal) over the study period. Re-
turn of investment (i.e., amount of financial return
relative to investment cost) of game and livestock was
quantified by pooling males and females of adults only,
using their value at auction. National and provincial eco-
nomic data were obtained from Statistics South Africa
(www.statssa.gov.za; statistical release P0441, accessed
December 2013) from 2003 to 2012. Auction and eco-
nomic data were standardized using the buying power
(1 + (Consumer Price Index/100) × yearly value) of the
South African Rand (CPI source: www.inflation.eu).
Identifying land-use types
Using a geographic information system (GIS), we di-
vided Limpopo into different land-use types by overlay-
ing formally registered game ranches (Exemption Prop-
erty Database, LEDET), protected areas (World Database
on Protected Areas; IUCN and UNEP-WCMC, accessed
December 2014), natural and man-made water bodies
(Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries), ur-
ban and rural settlements (Statistics South Africa), and
agricultural land (Department of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries), with the remainder comprising mixed
farms. Mixed farms in Limpopo predominantly prac-
tice game ranching, interspersed with livestock farming.
Game ranches may act as small pseudo-protected ar-
eas by restoring habitat and introducing species, but are
fundamentally different to protected areas in how they
are managed (Bond et al. 2004). Game ranch manage-
ment is profit-orientated with emphasis on the commer-
cial production of ungulate species (Bothma & Sartorius
2 Conservation Letters, June 2016, 0(0), 1–11 Copyright and Photocopying: C© 2016 The Authors. Conservation Letters published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
R. T. Pitman et al. Conservation costs of game ranching
Figure 1 Location of the study area situated between northern South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.White circles and gray
crosses represent permit applications for nuisance wildlife and nonnuisance wildlife, respectively. Inset represents the location of the study area within
Africa.
Von Bach 2010), whereas protected area management is
largely conservation-orientated (Leverington et al. 2010).
Therefore, to avoid potential bias relating to the man-
agement of protected areas (e.g., problem animal control
on protected areas is likely driven by underlying conser-
vation objectives such as disease control, rather than fi-
nancial motivations), we excluded protected areas from
our analyses. Land-use types were then categorized into
“nongame ranches” comprising agricultural land and ur-
ban and rural settlements, and “game ranches” compris-
ing formally registered game ranches and mixed farms.
Measuring conflict as a proxy for landowner
tolerance
In Limpopo, problem animal permits are issued to
landowners by the Limpopo Department of Economic
Development, Environment and Tourism (LEDET), for
the destruction of animals that reputedly pose a
risk to human life or livelihoods. To measure con-
flict, we used the number of problem animal permit
applications issued from 2003 to 2012 (Wildlife Trade
and Regulation Archives, LEDET). Problem animal per-
mit applications, whether approved or rejected, rep-
resent the intent of a landowner to destroy a puta-
tive problem animal, and therefore provides a reliable
gauge of tolerance. We acknowledge that human at-
titudes towards nuisance wildlife are multidimensional
(Kansky et al. 2014), yet justify our approach on the ba-
sis that tolerance levels likely degrade to a point where
landowners perceive legal destruction as a potential
solution. Free-ranging wildlife that potentially threaten
the profitability of the game ranching industry include
black-back jackal Canis mesomelas, brown hyaena Hyaena
brunnea, caracal Caracal caracal, cheetah Acinonyx jubatus,
lion Panthera leo, leopard Panthera pardus, spotted hyaena
Crocuta crocuta, and African elephant Loxodonta africana
(collectively referred to as “nuisance wildlife”). We also
collected problem animal permit applications for greater
kudu Tragelaphus strepsiceros and common duiker Sylvi-
capra grimmia (“nonnuisance wildlife”), as these two com-
mon ungulate species are frequently complicit in human–
wildlife conflict, but represent a minimal threat to game
ranching profitability. Global positioning system (GPS)
coordinates for the property location of each problem ani-
mal permit application were obtained from the Chief Sur-
veyor General’s registered property database (Cadastral
Spatial Information, Pretoria). Permit locations were pro-
jected across Limpopo, and assigned a land-use category
based on the underlying property.
Identifying game ranching practices
An online survey was conducted to assess how Limpopo’s
game ranching practices have changed over the study pe-
riod (respondent sample size = 116; Supporting Infor-
mation S2). Given the increasing prices of game across
southern Africa (Van Der Merwe et al. 2004), ranchers
were asked whether they (1) breed rare game (e.g., roan
antelope Hippotragus equinus, sable antelope Hippotragus
niger, buffalo Syncerus caffer), (2) breed colour variants
(e.g., black impala Aepyceros melampus, copper springbok
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Antidorcas marsupialis), and (3) breed extralimital game
(i.e., species that do not occur naturally in their region).
Only rare game and colour variants were considered
“high-value” species. Finally, given the increasing scien-
tific debate around fencing for wildlife (Woodroffe et al.
2014), ranchers were asked whether they used predator-
proof fencing. All questions required the year in which
the particular practice was first adopted.
Statistical analysis
Generalized linear models were used to assess trends over
time in game auction sales, game ranching practices, and
problem animal permit applications. All statistical analy-
ses were conducted within R v.3.2.0 (R Core Team 2015).
All data used in the analyses are available in Supporting
Information S3.
Results
Economic contribution of game ranching
Limpopo’s agricultural industry generated ZAR 27.64 bil-
lion (US$ 1.96 billion) from 2003 to 2012. The global
economic crisis of 2008 lead to an economic recession
in South Africa (Supporting Information S4), which re-
sulted in negative growth for all industries other than
agriculture (Supporting Information S5). Game ranch-
ing contributed 2.8% ± 0.3% (SE) to the growth in
Limpopo’s agricultural gross domestic product (GDP)
prior to the recession (2003–2007), and 12.8% ± 4.6%
(SE) during and after the recession (2008–2012). High-
value game breeding was a far greater contributor to
GDP than common game breeding over the 10-year pe-
riod (Figure 2B). Investing in high-value game breeding
in 2008 would have resulted in a return on investment
(ROI) of 187% by the end of 2012, whereas breeding
common game would have returned 57% over the same
period. Compared to high-value game, breeding of South
Africa’s common livestock species, such a Bonsmara cat-
tle (ROI: 60%), or Merino (ROI: 103%) and Dorper sheep
(ROI: 7%), would have resulted in far smaller returns on
investment.
Game ranching practices and trends in Limpopo
The average price (Table 1, row a; Figure 3B) and an-
nual turnover (Table 1, row b; Figure 3C) of game sold in
Limpopo increased significantly over the 10-year study
period. This primarily reflected a significant increase
in the number (Table 1, row c; Figure 3A) and price
(Table 1, row d; Figure 3B) of high-value species sold by
game ranchers, particularly after 2008. In contrast, the
number of common species sold decreased significantly
over the 10-year period (Table 1, row e; Figure 3A). Game
ranchers consistently paid higher prices for female high-
value game, than for males (Figure 2A), highlighting the
importance of breeding rather than hunting. As the num-
ber of game ranchers breeding high-value species signifi-
cantly increased over the 10-year period (Table 1, row f;
Figure 4A; n = 104), so did the number of ranchers us-
ing predator-proof fencing (Table 1, row g; Figure 4B;
n = 94).
Measuring conflict and understanding game
rancher tolerance
From 2003 to 2012, landowners submitted 693 problem
animal permit applications for nuisance wildlife, and 999
for nonnuisance wildlife. Most (79%) applications origi-
nated from game ranches. For nuisance wildlife, leopards
were the most common putative problem animal
(68%), followed by elephant (20%), lion (4%), brown
hyena (3%), black-backed jackal (2%), caracal (2%),
cheetah (0.5%), and spotted hyena (0.5%). Applications
by game ranchers for nuisance wildlife increased signifi-
cantly (Table 1, row h; Supporting Information S6a) over
the 10-year period, whereas no significant relationship
was detected for nuisance wildlife on nongame ranches
(Table 1, row i; Supporting Information S6b). Applica-
tions for nonnuisance wildlife on game ranches how-
ever approached significance (Table 1, row j; Support-
ing Information S6c), indicating an underlying positive
trend. The number of applications for nuisance wildlife
increased significantly with the number of game ranchers
breeding high-value species (Table 1, row k; Figure 5A),
and with the use of predator-proof fencing (Table 1, row
l; Figure 5B). Problem animal permit applications for
elephant, which damage fences (Mutinda et al. 2014),
began only once the use of predator-proof fencing had
markedly risen from 2008 (Figure 4B).
Discussion
The global shift from centrally driven decision-making
to a decentralized, local participatory process is argued
to represent a more legitimate and inclusive governance
system that improves local livelihoods and conservation
outcomes (Parker et al. 2015). Game ranching is widely
heralded as a conservation success and epitomizes
the devolutionary rights-based approach to natural re-
source management in southern Africa (Carruthers 2008;
Cousins et al. 2008). Yet, here we highlight the hid-
den costs of local decision making in the absence of ad-
equate centralized regulation and evidence-based best
practice necessary to uphold conservation objectives. We
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Figure 2 High-value game breeding and its economic contribution to Limpopo’s economy. (A) Average price (ZAR) of high-value game,
categorized by sex (higher price of females emphasizes the importance of breeding), and (B) high-value game breeding’s percentage contribution to
agricultural gross domestic product in LimpopoProvince, SouthAfrica from2003 to 2012 (gray shading represents 95%CI; prerecession years represented
by white bars and postrecession years represented by gray bars).
demonstrate that game ranching has become an impor-
tant and highly lucrative sector within the agricultural
industry. Game ranching practices have become more
intensive, to facilitate the breeding of high-value game
species. In response to the increased profitability of game
breeding, ranchers have adopted a dual-pronged ap-
proach to asset management by increasing predator-proof
fencing to keep free-ranging wildlife out, and reducing
populations of nuisance wildlife through legal destruc-
tion. Our findings demonstrate that the proportional in-
crease in problem animal control of nuisance wildlife has
far outweighed the proportional increase in game ranch-
ing trends towards more intensive practices—suggesting
that intolerance is growing in momentum. The conse-
quences of decreased tolerance towards ecologically im-
portant free-ranging wildlife is likely to have significant
detrimental impacts on species persistence and ecological
systems more broadly (Ripple et al. 2014, 2015).
Unreported and illegal killing of wildlife is a pertinent
issue across southern Africa (St John et al. 2012; Thorn
et al. 2013; Kahler & Gore 2015). Human-mediated carni-
vore mortality is widespread, especially amongst livestock
and game ranchers in Limpopo (St John et al. 2012). A
recent study on leopards in Limpopo demonstrated that
legal mortality is unsustainable (Pitman et al. 2015), and
camera-trapping surveys conducted during and after the
study period indicate that leopard populations are declin-
ing (Supporting Information S7). Elephant populations in
the region are increasing at 4% per annum (Blanc 2008),
but this growth is primarily confined to protected areas
(a land-use type removed from this study). Interestingly,
permit applications for elephants only began from 2008—
the same year in which predator proof fencing markedly
increased. This may suggest that predator proof fencing
has not only failed to mitigate some forms of conflict
in Limpopo, but actively contributed to decreased tol-
erance towards elephants. Game ranch expansion into
new territories decelerated by the late 1990’s (van der
Waal & Dekker 2000; Bothma & Sartorius Von Bach
2010), which suggests that game ranching territory has
not increased over the study period. Notably, Limpopo’s
human population has markedly grown (8.2% increase
from 2001 to 2011; Statistics South Africa 2011), which
has left the majority of suitable wildlife habitat in a highly
fragmented state (Swanepoel et al. 2013).
Given the high returns on investment, the shift toward
high-value game breeding has been, and continues to
be, rapidly adopted across the region. From an economic
standpoint, game ranching is a significant contributor
and is likely to remain an important component on
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Figure 3 Growth in Limpopo’s game ranching industry. Game auction data for high-value game, common game, and all game breeds combined
from2003 to 2012; categorized into (A) total head of game sold, (B) average price of game (ZAR), and (C) total annual turnover (ZAR), for Limpopo Province,
South Africa (gray shading represents 95% CI; prerecession years represented by white bars and postrecession years represented by gray bars).
political and economic agendas. Agricultural sectors
are considered informal economic safety nets during
periods of financial crises (Headey et al. 2010). This is
particularly relevant for developing countries where
agricultural products are not highly exported, and the in-
herent inelasticity of the agricultural sector to economic
downturn (Shovan 2004; Headey et al. 2010). Given the
increased economic reliance on agricultural productivity,
and the increased financial risk associated with intensive
high-value game breeding, decreased tolerance among
landowners toward putative problem animals appears
inevitable. The adoption of integrated conservation
and development projects (ICDPs), and local resource
management more generally, is often put forward as a
viable conflict mitigation option (Treves et al. 2009).
However, the effectiveness of ICDPs have been
mixed, particularly in regard to human–wildlife conflict
(Gandiwa et al. 2013). Attitudes around human–wildlife
coexistence are primarily influenced by how conflict is
managed, and importantly, the severity of conflict events
(Don Carlos et al. 2009). As the value of commercial
game increases, and consequently the severity of conflict,
attitudes toward nuisance wildlife become increasingly
antagonistic. The propensity to erect predator-proof
fencing in response to conflict raises further concerns
(Woodroffe et al. 2014), as it can fragment habitat and
significantly alter interactions between species, leading
to detrimental impacts on ecosystem functions (Terborgh
et al. 2001; Ripple et al. 2014).
The top three species killed as putative problem ani-
mals (leopards, elephants, and lions) are also the most
desired for nonconsumptive tourism (Di Minin et al.
2013). The contribution of charismatic species to a coun-
try’s economy, together with their ecological signifi-
cance, make them vitally important species to conserve
(Richardson & Loomis 2009). Game ranching has be-
come established in other southern African countries;
including Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
(Bond et al. 2004; Lindsey et al. 2009b). In addition, we
highlight an issue limited not only to Africa, as European
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Figure 4 High-value game breeding and the adoption
of predator-proof fencing. Cumulative proportion of game
ranches (A) breeding high-value game and (B) using
predator-proof fencing to protect their game in Limpopo
Province, South Africa from 2003 to 2012 (gray shading
represents 95% CI; prerecession years represented by white
bars and postrecession years represented by gray bars).
Figure 5 Legal destruction of nuisance wildlife and the adoption of game breeding practices. (A) Breeding of high-value game and (B) using
predator-proof fencing (gray shading represents 95% CI; outlier represents the economic recession of 2008).
countries (e.g., Spain) have also demonstrated decreased
tolerance toward large carnivores following the adoption
of intensive game management practices (Lo´pez-Bao et al.
2015). Threatened species within these countries require
extensive rangelands to maintain large and biologically
viable populations (Graham et al. 2009). The adoption
of game ranching is largely perceived to be a compati-
ble land-use option for the protection of these threatened
species (Cousins et al. 2008). However, the increased use
of predator-proof fencing and legal destruction of wildlife
in Limpopo, suggests that game ranching practices have
become less compatible with species conservation.
Given the scale of decentralization and the widespread
adoption of game ranching, together with the economic
instability faced by countries within southern Africa, fur-
ther research is required to quantify the extent to which
ecologically important species are persecuted as a result
of intensive game ranching practices. In South Africa,
game ranching trends are currently accelerating, with
high-value species being sold at record prices (e.g., sable
antelope bull and kudu bull sold for ZAR 27 million
[US$ 1.9 million] and ZAR 9.4 million [US$ 0.7 mil-
lion] in 2015, respectively; www.vleissentraal.co.za; date
accessed: 29 September 2015). By bestowing custodial
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rights of wildlife to individual property owners, legislative
policies encouraged innovation among the private and
communal sectors that has ultimately inflicted a signif-
icant cost to wildlife conservation. Given these findings,
devolution-based natural resource management likely re-
quires increased centralized regulation to limit, or bet-
ter control, the widespread adoption of intensive game
ranching practices and their negative consequences on
large-scale conservation objectives. Increased centralized
regulation likely provides a more scientifically justified,
holistic approach to land management and conservation,
but may also present significant disadvantages. Limit-
ing the use of wildlife may diminish their value and
make them an intolerable financial burden (Murombedzi
2003), while centralized governance may disempower
individuals and communities (Carruthers 2008), leading
to noncompliance in conservation objectives and a gen-
eral distrust towards governing authorities. The solution
to the conservation issue we highlight therefore requires
adept consideration of all stakeholders within a transpar-
ent and science-based framework.
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